Strategic games with Congress and the states
Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin
Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers
Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn
"John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg
Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers
Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy
A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan
Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser
Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson
Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire
Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum
Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers.
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Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court. ISBN 0813925274. Published by University of Virginia Press in 2006. Publication and catalogue information, links to buy online and reader comments.
