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Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance
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Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance

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Contents

Robust regulators and their political masters : independence and accountability in theory / Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor
Independence and accountability in supervision : general principles and European setting / Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
The fear of freedom : politicians and the independence and accountability of financial supervisors in practice / Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor
Independence and accountability : why politics matters / Johnathan Westrup
Governance in banking supervision : theory and practices / Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini
Financial supervision architectures and central bank independence / Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro
Architectures of supervisory authorities and banking supervision / Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini
Experience with integrated supervisors : governance and quality of supervision / Martin Cihak and Richard Podpiera
Financial supervisors : alternative models / Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia
Budgetary governance of banking supervision : a primer / Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriette Prast
Bureaucrats or politicians? / Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini
Agency problems in banking supervision / Robert A. Eisenbeis.

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Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance. ISBN 9781847202161. Published by Edward Elgar in 2007. Publication and catalogue information, links to buy online and reader comments.

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