A theory of understanding
Truth's role in understanding
Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts
Do pragmatist views avoid this critique?
A realistic account
How evidence and truth are related
Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding
Anchoring
Next steps
Reference and reasons
The main thesis and its location
Exposition and four argument-types
Significance and consequences of the main thesis
The first person as a case study
Fully self-conscious thought
Immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person
Can a use of the first-person concept fail to refer?
Some conceptual roles are distinctive but not fundamental
Implicit conceptions
Implicit conceptions : motivation and examples
Deflationary readings rejected
The phenomenon of new principles
Explanation by implicit conceptions
Rationalist aspects
Consequences : rationality, justification, understanding
Transitional
Applications to mental concepts
Conceiving of conscious states
Understanding and identity in other cases
Constraints on legitimate explanations in terms of identity
Why is the subjective case different?
Attractions of the interlocking account
Tacit knowledge, and externalism about the internal
Is this the myth of the given?
Knowledge of others' conscious states
Communicability : between Frege and Wittgenstein
Conclusions and significance
'Another I' : representing perception and action
The core rule
Modal status and its significance
Comparisons
The possession-condition and some empirical phenomena
The model generalized
Wider issues
Mental action
The distinctive features of action-awareness
The nature and range of mental actions
The principal hypothesis and its grounds
The principal hypothesis : distinctions and consequences
How do we know about our own mental actions?
Concepts of mental actions and their epistemological significance
Is this account open to the same objections as perceptual models of introspection?
Characterizing and unifying schizophrenic experience
The first person in the self-ascription of action
Rational agency and action-awareness
Representing thoughts
The puzzle
A proposal
How the solution treats the constraints that generate the puzzle
Relation to single-level treatments
An application : reconciling externalism with distinctive self-knowledge.
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Truly understood by Christopher Peacocke. ISBN 9780199239443. Published by Oxford University Press in 2008. Publication and catalogue information, links to buy online and reader comments.
