Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear
The general theory for current preferences default rules
Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action
Inferring current preferences from agency action
From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences
Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning
Eliciting legislative preferences
Canons favoring the politically powerless
Linguistic canons of statutory construction
Interpretations that may create international conflict
Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis
Tracking the preferences of political subunits
Tracking high court preferences
The fit with prior political science models and empirical data
Interest groups and collective choice theory
Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect
Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.
OBNB doesn't sell books, but you may be able to find a copy at one of these websites:
Statutory default rules : how to interpret unclear legislation by Einer Elhauge. ISBN 9780674024601. Published by Harvard University Press in 2008. Publication and catalogue information, links to buy online and reader comments.
