Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave :: Florian Englmaier :: Centre for Economic Policy Research 2010 :: OBNB, the Open British National Bibliography

Publication Data

Title Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave
Author Florian Englmaier
Contributors Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, Centre for Economic Policy Research
Publisher Centre for Economic Policy Research
Publication date 2010
Publication location London
Language English

Descriptive Notes

"July 2010."
"Industrial organization."--Cover.

Topics

Contracts :: Mathematical models
Limited liability
Moral hazard

Catalogue Data

OBNB ID GBB175972
ISBN 10 n/a
ISBN 13 n/a
Type BibliographicResource, Book
Dewey Classification 346.022

ISBD

P1053 50 p.
P1042 Includes bibliographical references.

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Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave by Florian Englmaier. Published by Centre for Economic Policy Research in 2010. Publication and catalogue information, links to buy online and reader comments.