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Signalling, incumbency advantage, and optimal reelection rules

Francesco Caselli

Publication Data

Title Signalling, incumbency advantage, and optimal reelection rules
Author Francesco Caselli
Contributor
Publisher Centre for Economic Performance
Publication date 0000
Publication location London

Topics

Elections :: Econometric models
Political campaigns :: Econometric models
Game theory

Catalogue Data

OBNB ID GBB4B1246
ISBN 10 n/a
ISBN 13 n/a
Type BibliographicResource, Book
Dewey Classification 324.6

ISBD

P1053 1 online resource (28 pages)
P1042 Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-25).

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Signalling, incumbency advantage, and optimal reelection rules by Francesco Caselli. Published by Centre for Economic Performance. Publication and catalogue information, links to buy online and reader comments.