Military mission performance in Latin America
Challenges to security and democratic civil-military relations in the Andes
Explaining military mission performance in democratic Latin America
Case selection: a focus on the army in Peru and Ecuador
The data
Overview of the analysis
Civil-military relations in democratic Peru and Ecuador
High constraints on Peru's military
Low constraints on Ecuador's military
Army mission performance in post-transition Peru and Ecuador, 1980s-1990s
Sovereignty before policing
Deviations: contradictions in missions and sovereignty neglect
Alternative explanations
Mission constraint and neglect of counterinsurgency: Peru since 2000
Staying in the barracks
Restrictions on army autonomy
Mission overload and neglect of border defense: Ecuador since 2000
Neglecting a porous border while policing the interior
Overwhelming security responsibilities
Battalions for hire: private army contracts in Peru and Ecuador
Resource-hungry armu units
Local client influence
Limits to client influence
Comparative perspectives on military mission performance
Colombia: tolerance of policing amid ongoing insurgency
Venezuela: mission loss, organizational trauma, and rejection of police work
Bolivia: policing despite organizational trauma
Extreme executive control: trends in Venezuela and Bolivia
Reflections on assigning militaries to conduct police work
Appendix. Field research methodology.
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Military politics and democracy in the Andes by Maiah Jaskoski. ISBN 9781421409078. Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press in 2013. Publication and catalogue information, links to buy online and reader comments.
