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Central Bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy

Francesco Lippi

Publication Data

Title Central Bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy
Author Francesco Lippi
Publisher Edward Elgar
Publication date 1999
Publication location Cheltenham
Language English

Topics

Banks and banking, Central :: European Union countries
007459404

Catalogue Data

OBNB ID GB9914930
ISBN 10 1858989159
ISBN 13 n/a
Type BibliographicResource, Book
Dewey Classification 332.11

ISBD

P1053 viii, 162p.
P1042 Includes bibliographical references and index.

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Central Bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy by Francesco Lippi. ISBN 1858989159. Published by Edward Elgar in 1999. Publication and catalogue information, links to buy online and reader comments.